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CREIES AGAINST PEACE-
MANUEL R. GARCfA-MORA*
O F the three charges contained'in the Charter of the International
.Military Tribunal that sat at Niirnberg,l the so-called "crimes
against peace" have undoubtedly caused the greatest controversy. Techni-
cal questions concerning the novelty of this charge and the retroactive
character of the law applied by the Tribunal were vigorously contested
by international jurists at the time.- And even after the execution of the
Niirnberg judgment, difficulties remained regarding the nature of crimes
against peace and the application of the Niirnberg precedent in future
international law.3 Today, after almost two decades, these problems
persist.
In addition, crimes against peace are likely to be regarded as political
offenses, thus giving rise to the denial of extradition where the offenders
have taken refuge in a foreign country. This particular problem arose in
the post-war era when the prosecution of the Nazi leaders responsible for
the war was undertaken. Moreover, these problems are specially relevant
in connection with contemporary schemes designed for the maintenance
of peace. It is necessary to determine, therefore, the precise nature of
crimes against peace as construed by the Niirnberg and other military
tribunals, and to discuss the development of this concept in subsequent
international instruments. These crimes will then be viewed from the
standpoint of political offenses.
I. THE NATU=E OF CRnIs AGAINST PEACE
According to the Niirnberg Charter, crimes against peace consist in the
"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a
i This article, intended as a chapter of a book, was originally entitled, "Crimes Against
Peace in International Law: An Attempt at Clearification from Niirnberg to the Present."
Other chapters of the book, which was incomplete at the time of Professor Garcia-Mora's
death, will appear throughout the year in other legal periodicals. His intended book was
to explore not only the law of extraditable offenses, but also the concept of political (non-
extraditable) offenses.
* Late Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. For text of the Charter, see 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Inter-
national Military Tribunal 10 (1947) [hereinafter cited as International Trial].
2. For a refutation of some of these objections, see Glueck, The Nuernberg Trial and
Aggressive War, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 396, 407-1S (1946). For a contrary view, see Raja Gabaglia,
Guerra e Direito Internacional 114-15 (1949).
3. See Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nueremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in In-
ternational Law, 1 Int'l L.Q. 153 (1947). See also Rousseau, Droit International Public 578-
79 (1953) ; Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 35S-63 (rev. ed. 1959); Schvarzen-
berger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 Tul. L. Rev. 329, 344-51 (1947).
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war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing. . . ."I Essentially the same perspective may be seen
to infuse the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East,5 under which the Japanese leaders were tried and punished; and the
Control Council Law No. 10 enacted on December 20, 1945,0 by the Four
Powers occupying Germany, for the trial of the so-called minor war
criminals.' The application of the NUrnberg provision was generally
revealed as inept for the specific circumstances of the cases.8 The prin-
ciples involved proved embarrassing to the presiding judges and led them
to base their determinations upon two assumptions, the validity of which
has been seriously questioned. The first of such assumptions consists in
the belief that a war of aggression was an international crime before the
London Agreement of August 8, 1945, under which the International
Military Tribunal at Nfirnberg was established. The Tribunal succinctly
stated that, in its opinion, "aggressive war is a crime under international
law."' 0 Unfortunately, however, the Niimnberg Judgment did not ade-
quately deal with this assertion, thus leaving the matter subject to much
speculation and doubt. Instead, the Tribunal contented itself with stating
that "the law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the Tri-
bunal,' and that, since the Charter made "the planning or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties a
crime .. . ." it was not "strictly necessary to consider whether and to what
extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the London
Agreement."'1 2 It did say, however, that "to initiate a war of aggression
.. . is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international
4. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6, para. (a); see
note 1 supra.
5. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5, para. (a). There
is a slight modification in the wording of the provision, for the Tokyo Charter conferred
jurisdiction on the Tribunal to try "Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planing, prepara-
tion, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing . . . ." For text of this
Charter, see In re Hirota, [19483 Ann. Dig. 356, 357-58 (No. 118) (Japan).
6. For the text of this law, see Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on
the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 250 (1949).
7. Control Council Law No. 10, art. II, § 1, para. (a).
8. Professor Percy E. Corbett states that those who wrote the decision "were catching
at straws." Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 231 (1951).
9. For the text of this Agreement, see Sohn, Cases on United Nations Law 858-59 (1956).
10. 1 International Trial 224. See also 22 International Trial 467. Long before 1945,
Professor H. Donnedieu de Vabres had maintained that "a war of aggression is a crime." de
Vabres, Les Princip6s Modernes du Droit Pnal International 426 (1928).
11. 1 International Trial 218.
12. 22 International Trial 461.
[Vol. 34
CRIMES AGAINST PEACE
crime ... .113 The Tribunal supported its position by citing such pre-war
agreements as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 192S, outlawing war
as an instrument of national policy; the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assist-
ance sponsored by the League of Nations in 1923, providing, in Article 1,
"that aggressive war is an international crime"; the Preamble to the
League of Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes of 1924, stating that a war of aggression constitutes a violation
of the solidarity between nations and is, therefore, an international crime;
the declaration adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on
September 24, 1927, that war is an international crime; and the resolution
unanimously adopted on February 18, 1928, by the twenty-one American
Republics at Havana, providing that "war of aggression constitutes an
international crime against the human species."'14 This is an impressive
list indeed, but it should be added, however, that, apart from the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, which at the outbreak of the war was in force between
sixty-three States, the other instruments mentioned by the Tribunal either
never came into force or else were mere resolutions without any binding
force. And even in respect to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, no specific con-
demnation of aggressive war nor an individual criminal liability for this
offense is found therein.' 5 The assumption, therefore, that a war of ag-
gression is an international crime remains, in the main, highly con-
jectural.0
The second important assumption underlying the Niirnberg Judgment
concerns the criterion of aggression adopted by the Tribunal. The Tri-
bunal seemed to have assumed that aggression was a well established and
fairly precise concept in international criminal law. Yet, unlike domestic
criminal legislation, where crimes are precisely defined so that indiduals
may know exactly the limits of permissible behavior, the crime of aggres-
sion is a most vague and general concept not yet defined nor described by
any international instrument. 7 The Niirnberg Charter itself offered no
criterion of aggression for the guidance of the Tribunal, nor did the latter
13. Id. at 427.
14. 1 International Trial 222.
15. Monaco, Manuale di Diritto Internazionale Pibblico 163 (19C0). But see Pompe, Ag-
gressive War, An International Crime 2.53-54 (1953).
16. Stone, op. cit. supra note 3, at 325; see 2 Guggenheim, Trait de Droit internatioral
public 42-43 (1954); 2 Podesti Costa, Derecho Internacional PNblico 322-23 (3d ed. 1955);
Schwarzenberger, op. cit. supra note 3, at 346. See also the disenting opinion of Judgze Roling
in the Tokyo judgment, where he maintains that aggressive war, although perhaps the subjczt
of moral condemnation, was "'not considered a true crime before and in the beginning of this
war and could not be considered as such for lack of those conditions in international relations
on which such a view could be based.'" In re Hirota, [194S] Ann. Dig. 356, 375 (Xo. 113)
(Japan). But see Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 33, 72 (1947).
17. Memorandum of Ricardo J. Alfaro on the Question of Defining Aggrezion, Ur .
Doc. No. A/C.4/L.8 (1951).
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ever formulate any criteria in the course of its decisions. 8 As the United
Nations International Law Commission subsequently observed, what the
Tribunal did was to review the historical events before and during the
war in an effort to determine whether aggression had been committed by
the defendants. 19 From such a broad and flexible orientation, the Tribunal
found that certain of the defendants had committed acts of aggression in
seizing Austria and Czechoslovakia,2 0 and war of aggression against
Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia,
Greece, the Soviet Union, and the United States.21 The Tribunal signifi-
cantly added that these findings made it unnecessary to discuss in detail
whether these aggressive wars were also " 'wars in violation of inter-
national treaties, agreements, or assurances' " within the terms of the
Charter.2 2 It is thus obvious that a war of aggression may technically
exist quite independently of a war " 'in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances.' " It may also be noted that these two kinds of
war constitute two separate and independent categories of crimes against
peace.
Despite the broad generalizations of the Niirnberg Judgment, certain
legal principles can be readily perceived which reveal more clearly the
nature of crimes against peace as understood by the Tribunal. Turning
again to the Niirnberg Charter, it will be recalled that crimes against
peace embrace a series of offenses consisting in the planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or participation in a common
18. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Ag-
gression 136 (1958). The Tokyo Charter did not offer a definition of aggression either.
However, the Tribunal did formulate some kind of a criterion. Thus, in describing the war
of aggression which Japan launched on December 7, 1941, against Britain, the United States,
and the Netherlands as "unprovoked attacks, prompted by the desire to seize the possessions
of these nations," the Tribunal continued, "Whatever may be the difficulty of stating a
comprehensive definition of 'a war of aggression,' attacks made with the above motive can-
not but be characterized as wars of aggression." For this part of the Tokyo Judgment, see
Sohn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 915.
19. See Formulation of the Niirnberg Principles, International Law Comm'n, Report,
U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12 (A/1316), at 11-14 (1950).
20. These aggressive actions were regarded as steps in the plan to wage aggressive war.
See 22 International Trial 433-39. However, some of the decisions of the American Military
Tribunals established at Niirnberg under Control Council Law No. 10 regarded the
seizure of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia as aggressive in the case of Austria and as
aggressive invasion in the case of Czechoslovakia, and, in both cases, as crimes against peace.
See, e.g., United States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nueren-
berg Military Tribunals 314, 336-37 (1949). For an excellent discussion of this distinction,
see Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law 223-24 (1960).
21. 22 International Trial 439-58.
22. 1 International Trial 216.
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plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of the preceding acts?3
Although, at first, it may appear that each one of these acts constitutes a
separate and distinct crime against peace,2 4 in practice, however,
the guilt of the defendants was judged on the basis of two counts whose
precise limits are difficult to mark in specific cases. '3 Count one dealt with
a common plan or conspiracy to plan, prepare, initiate and wage aggres-
sive war, while count two was concerned with the planning, preparation,
initiation and waging of specific wars of aggression.2 The vague and
clumsy drafting of these two counts left the Niirnberg Charter open to
wide and flexible interpretation which was sometimes productive of highly
undesirable results. The separate discussion of the two counts will
adequately support this conclusion.
Wholly apart from the fact that the Charter did not define conspiracy2,
international jurists have agreed that there was no crime of conspiracy in
international law in 1939, and that, even in domestic legal systems
other than those of the common-law world, this crime is largely un-
known. 8 Yet it must not be assumed that the Tribunal regarded con-
spiracy within the meaning of Anglo-American criminal law?3 The Tri-
bunal considered conspiracy as a number of closely related acts developed
from 1919 to 1945 and including the formation of the Nazi Party in 1919
as "'the instrument of cohesion among the Defendants . . .. " the over-
throw of the Treaty of Versailles, secret rearmament by Germany, and the
planning and waging of aggressive actions."" What seems particularly sig-
nificant is that these acts in themselves did not constitute a criminal con-
spiracy under the indictment unless they were a part of a plan to wage
aggressive war. The Tribunal was most explicit in this connection.
[T]he conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be
too far removed from the time of decision and of action. The planning, to be criminal,
must not rest merely on the declarations of a party program. such as are found in the
25 points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920, or the political affirmations espressed
23. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6, para. (a); see
note 1 supra.
24. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 445 (1959).
25. The Tribunal said: "We shall... discuss both Counts together, as they are in sub-
stance the same." 1 International Trial 224.
26. Id. at 29, 42. The counts actually overlap. See Leventhal, Harris, Woolsey & Farr, The
Nuernberg Verdict, 60 Harv. L. Rev. S57, SS1-S2 (1947).
27. The Tokyo judgment defined conspiracy as "an agreement" to wage aggrezsive var.
Sohn, op. ciL supra note 9, at 910.
28. For discussion, see Stone, op. cit. supra note 3, at 361.
29. See generally Perkins, Criminal Law 527 (1957); Williams, Criminal Law § 212 (2d
ed. 1961).
30. 1 International Trial 224-25.
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in Mein Kampf in later years. The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan
to wage war existed, and determine the participants in that concrete plan.8'
It can be readily seen, therefore, that the crime of conspiracy cannot
be isolated from the crime of waging concrete wars of aggression under
count two of the indictment. Yet it has already been seen that conspiracy
to commit aggression and the waging of specific wars of aggression are,
in principle, two separate and distinct crimes against peace.
The technical difficulty faced by the Tribunal in the crime of describing
conspiracy can be clearly seen in another portion of the Judgment. While
the notion of conspiracy in Anglo-American criminal law signifies a
combination between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or
to do a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means, thus implying the exist-
ence of a "unity of design and purpose,"3 2 the Nirnberg Judgment
apparently could not point to one single combination embracing one single
master plan to commit crimes against peace. What it did find were
separate plans, which were nothing more than "a series of connected
events"3 leading up to the commission of aggressive wars. The Tribunal
sharply stated:
It is not necessary to decide whether a single master conspiracy between the
defendants has been established by the evidence .... [T]he evidence establishes with
certainty the existence of many separate plans rather than a single conspiracy em-
bracing them all. . . . It is immaterial to consider whether a single conspiracy to the
extent and over the time set out in the Indictment has been conclusively proved.
Continued planning, with aggressive war as the objective, has been established beyond
doubt.34
Conceivably, therefore, conspiracy could exist even though no specific
combination for the accomplishment of the unlawful act was present."
A distinguished jurist has suggested that this rather flexible interpretation
may well have been adopted to allow more latitude in the proof of the
other counts than would otherwise be permitted under the conspiracy con-
cept in Anglo-American law. 6 The force of this suggestion can be most
clearly seen when remembering that not a single defendant was convicted
on the conspiracy count alone, and that conviction on this count was only
had when connected with the planning and preparation for specific wars
31. Id. at 225.
32. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 29, at 530.
33. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 201 (1963).
34. 1 International Trial 225.
35. In United States v. Von Leeb, 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuerenberg
Military Tribunals 462, 488-89 (1948), a United States Military Tribunal stressed the neccs-
sity of proving the existence of a concrete plan in order to constitute the crime of conspiracy
to commit a crime against peace.
36. Stone, op. cit. supra note 3, at 361.
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of aggression under count two.3 7 It thus becomes clear that the conspiracy
count was rather unnecessary and superfluous, since the criminal liability
of the defendants could have been adequately judged on the basis of
planning and preparation for specific wars of aggression under count two
of the indictment3 8 This observation is of critical importance, for any
assessment of the future of the crime of conspiracy in international law
must take account of the confusion and uncertainty underlying the Niirn-
berg Judgment. On such a basis, the assertion that there is a notion of
conspiracy to commit a crime against peace can hardly be supported 93
The second count of the Niimberg Indictment embraces in its widest
sweep all the component steps leading to the commission of a war of ag-
gression. More specifically considered, these components include the "plan-
ning," "preparation," "initiation," and "waging" of aggressive war. While
these concepts might logically be expected to differ in their technical
import, the Niirnberg Judgment did not distinguish between "planning"
and "preparation," and, further, failed to give a separate consideration
to the concept of "initiation." The operative reality of these four con-
ceptions are essentially reduced by the Judgment to "preparation" and
"waging" of aggressive war."0 This certainly reflects the atmosphere of
ambiguity and abstraction in which the Niirnberg Charter was framed.
Looking comprehensively at the Judgment, some light may be shed
upon the meaning of the above conceptions. Thus, "planning" and
"preparation" were considered by the Tribunal as embracing all the
stages necessary for the initiation of a war of aggression. The Tribunal
clearly said that "planning and preparation are essential to the making
of war."" It will naturally follow that "planning" and "preparation"
cannot be regarded as elements of guilt under the counts of the Indict-
ment unless they are a part of a specific plan for the making of aggressive
war. Clearly then, the "planning" and "preparation" for a nebulous and
future plan of aggression, unconsummated by a concrete aggressive war,
is not sufficient to engage the criminal responsibility of the individuals
concerned.4 2 The trial of Schacht is particularly instructive in this con-
nection for, while the Tribunal recognized that he was largely responsible
37. It is also interesting to note that, though count one alho charged conspiracy to com-
mit war crimes and crimes against humanity, the latter conspiracy variant was disrearded
by the Tribunal. See 1 International Trial 226.
3S. Brownlhe, op. cit. supra note 33, at 201.
39. Brand, The War Crime Trials and the Laws of War, 26 Brit. Yb. Intl L. 414, 419-21
(1949).
40. See Kelsen, Principles of International Law;, 135 (1932), w.here the view is ad-
vanced that "planning," "preparation" and "initiation" of v."ar are new international crimes
41. 1 International Trial 224.
42. Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 33, at 196.
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for the rapid rearmament of Germany after 1933, he was nevertheless
acquitted on both counts. This portion of the Judgment is specially
significant, for the Tribunal unmistakably made the crime of "planning"
and "preparation" for aggressive war entirely dependent upon the waging
of such a war. The Tribunal thus stated: "But rearmament of itself
is not criminal under the Charter. To be a Crime against Peace under
Article 6 of the Charter it must be shown that Schacht carried out this
rearmament as part of the Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars. 7
4
3
From this passage, it should be evident that, if "planning" and "prep-
aration" are found to exist in a specific case, criminal responsibility is
still no necessary result. In these terms, "planning" and "preparation"
really represent the beginning of a particular pattern of behavior, which
can be characterized as criminal if functionally related to aggressive
war. It may be noted additionally that implicit in the Schacht decision is
the distinction between actions and policies in support of the war effort
which are criminal, and those which are not.44 The decisive test in this
connection is whether such actions and policies are directly connected
with plans of aggression.
In contrast with "planning" and "preparation," the "waging" of aggres-
sive war is by itself a crime against peace, even if not directly connected
with the former. Thus conceived, the "waging" of aggressive war is
totally independent of "planning" and "preparation." The opinion of the
Tribunal in respect to Admiral Donitz illustrates this point well, for he
was convicted under count two alone for waging aggressive submarine
warfare, even though no connection with the "planning" and "prepara-
tion" of such war could be found.4 5 Moreover, the conviction on this
charge of civilians, such as industrialists and financiers, as well as military
men, strikingly indicates that the crime of waging unlawful war is not
limited to the exclusive military facets of a war.40
It finally remains to observe that, although the crime of waging aggres-
sive war would seem to be fairly broad in that its existence is not neces-
sarily dependent upon any other factor, the Tribunal significantly con-
victed on this charge only those defendants who were so close to Hitler as
43. 1 International Trial 309.
44. Thus, the Tribunal acquitted Speer who became head of the armament industry.
"His activities in charge of German armament production were in aid of the war effort In
the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war; but the Tribunal
is not prepared to find that such activities involve engaging in the common plan to wage
aggressive war as charged under Count One or waging aggressive war as charged under
Count Two." 1 International Trial 330-31.
45. Id. at 310-11; see 22 International Trial 556-57.
46. Besides military men, such civilians as Frick, Rosenberg and Von Neurath were con-
victed under count two. See 22 International Trial 544-47, 539-41, 579-82.
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both to possess concrete knowledge of his aggressive plans and to col-
laborate intimately with him47 It would seem inexorably to follow,
therefore, that the aggressive war charge applies only to high-ranking
military personnel and high State officials and, consequently, not every-
one in uniform who fights in a war of aggression can be charged with the
crime."5 This is certainly a most reasonable construction, for the concep-
tion of "waging" would seem to imply the ability to influence policy de-
cisions, a power which personnel below the top echelon of the State do
not possess. 49 It may thus be submitted that, in assessing the guilt of
the defendants under the charge of aggressive war, the Niirnberg Tri-
bunal adopted a fairly narrow test of responsibility, thereby substantially
limiting the scope of the crime.00
From the foregoing exposition, the most conspicuous facts about crimes
against peace are both their vague and general description, and the utter
lack of agreement regarding their criminality under international law.0'
For an accurate consideration of this point, it is highly relevant to con-
trast, briefly, crimes against peace with war crimes and crimes against
humanity-both of which were also punishable under the Niirnberg
Charter. 2 The conception of war crimes was not new in 1945, but has
reference to specific violations of the laws and customs of war made
punishable by domestic legislation and international conventions.p
Similarly, crimes against humanity consist of acts generally recognized as
criminal by the penal law of all civilized States-1 Therefore, war crimes
and crimes against humanity refer to clearly defined offenses, whose
criminality was recognized long before 1945, so that the charge of ex
47. See 22 International Trial 463-69.
4S. This was the assumption of the International Law Commission in formulating the
Ninberg Principles; see note 19 supra.
49. This point was repeatedly stressed in the trials of the so-called minor war criminals
by American Military Tribunals. See United States v. Von Leeb, 11 Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuerenberg Military Tribunals 462, 4S3-S9 (1943). In United States v. Krupp,
9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuerenberg Military Tribunals 393 (1950), the proszcu-
tion did not discharge its burden of proof on this point, and, therefore, the charge of crimes
against peace was dismissed by the Tribunal.
50. de Vabres, Le Procis de Nuremberg Devant les Principes du Droit Pnal Interna-
tional, 70 Hague Recuel 477, 528 (1947).
51. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
52. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nfirnberg art. 6, paras. (b)-(c);
see note 1 supra.
53. See Garcia-M ora, War Crimes and the Principle of Non-extradition of Political Of-
fenders, 9 Wayne L. Rev. 269, 270-75 (1963).
54. See Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition of
Political Offenders, 62 lich. L. Rev. 927 (1964).
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post facto legislation could not possibly be applied to them.", Crimes
against peace, on the other hand, were rather novel in 1945, thus giving
rise to the charge5" of ex post facto legislation; and, even after Niirn-
berg and the other war crimes cases, they have remained largely un-
defined, and, therefore, considerable controversy and doubt still attend
their determination. Subject to this qualification, the general effect of the
charge of crimes against peace is somewhat weakened by the uncertainty
underlying its application and, thus, can scarcely be a hopeful subject for
an international agreement in the near future.
II. CRIMES AGAINST PEACE IN THE DRAFT CODE OF OFFENSES
AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND
Partially in recognition of the above considerations, and in an attempt
at clarification, the United Nations General Assembly requested the
International Law Commission in 1947 (a) to formulate the principles
of International law recognized in the Charter and in the Judgment of
the Niirnberg Tribunal, and (b) to prepare a Draft Code of Offenses
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, indicating clearly the place
to be accorded to the above principles."1 While the formulation of the
International Law Commission regarding the Judgment of the Nirnberg
Tribunal reproduced in almost identical terms the provision of the Niirn-
berg Charter concerning crimes against peace so that no progress was
made in this regard,5" the real innovation of the Commission consisted
in the adoption of a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and
Security of Mankind in its third session in 1951.1 The most important
aspect of this Code is its attempt to impute criminal responsibility to
individuals for acts which previously only engaged the responsibility of
the State.60 After providing that "offenses against the peace and security
55. See generally Paoli, Contribution h l'tude des Crimes de Guerre et des Crimes Contre
l'Humanit6 en Droit P6nal International, 49 Revue G6nral de Droit International Public
129 (1945).
56. For the view that this charge was not really new, see Maridakis, Un pr6cedent du
Proc&s de Nuremberg tir6 de l'histoire de ]a Grace ancienne, 5 Revue Hell6nique de Drolt
International 1 (1952).
57. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 2d Sess., Res. No. 177 (A/519) (1947).
58. See Principle VI, which incorporates the Niirnberg provision. For text, see note 19
supra.
59. For text, see International Law Comm'n, Report, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 6th Sess.,
Supp. No. 9 (A/1858), at 10-14 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Draft Code]. This Code was
revised in 1954. For the Amendments, see Sohn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 998-1001.
60. For a discussion of the Draft Code from the standpoint of individual responsibility,
see Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against
Foreign States 36-46 (1962).
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of mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes under international law,
for which the responsible individuals shall be punishable,""' the Draft
Code proceeds to enumerate the acts which fall into this forbidden cate-
gory. A careful reading of these acts at once reveals three fundamental
departures from the Niirnberg Charter and Judgment.
First, while the Draft Code evidently seeks to project much the same
policy that the Niirnberg Charter sought to apply in respect to crimes
against peace, it has, however, enlarged the scope of such crimes by
linking them with other offenses which affect the security of mankind.
It is for this reason that war crimes and crimes against humanity, which
under the Niirnberg Charter were separate crimes, are now included
within the category of the general offenses described in the Code. 2 The
offenses against the peace and security of mankind, therefore, go far
beyond the acts giving rise to responsibility for crimes against peace
under the Niirnberg Charter.
Secondly, while both the Niirnberg Charter and Tribunal failed to
give a definition of a war of aggression, the Draft Code, on the other
hand, has attempted a general and inexhaustive description of aggressive
acts. It says in this connection that an act of aggression includes "the
employment by the authorities of a State of armed force against another
State for any purpose other than national or collective self-defence or in
pursuance of a decision or recommendation by a competent organ of the
United Nations.", 3 It may significantly be added that such other acts
as any threat to resort to an act of aggression,14 preparation for the em-
ployment of armed force against another State,c5 incursion of armed
bands into foreign territory,"0 fomenting civil strife, 7 and encouragement
of terrorist activities against another State are also regarded as offenses
against the peace and security of mankind and, foreseeably, as acts of
aggression. The comments on every one of these offenses specifically
state that the offenses thus defined can only be committed by the author-
ities of the State, although the criminal responsibility of private persons
is similarly envisaged.
Third, included in the Draft Code are notions of conspiracy, incite-
61. Draft Code art. 1.
62. Id. art. 2, paras. (10)-(11). In paragraph (9), genocide is also included as an of-
fense.
63. Id. para. (2).
64. Ibid.
65. Id. para. (3). 'Preparation" was used here in the same sense as it was used by the
Niirnberg Tribunal. Thus, in this offense, "preparation" includes "planning."
66. Id. para. (4).
67. Id. para. (5).
6S. Id. para. (6).
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ment, attempt, and complicity to commit the offense which are difficult
to grasp, unless related to the actual determinations of the Niirnberg
Tribunal.69 The Draft Code thus states that the following shall constitute
punishable offenses:
(i) Conspiracy to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding paragraphs
of this article; or
(ii) Direct incitement to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding
paragraphs of this article; or
(iii) Attempts to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding paragraphs
of this article; or
(iv) Complicity in the commission of any of the offences defined in the preceding
paragraphs of this article.70
The comment on this provision clearly indicates that the notion of "con-
spiracy" was taken from the Niirnberg Charter and, therefore, carried
with it the uncertainties of the Niirnberg Judgment. The notions of
"incitement," "attempt," and "complicity" are not found in the Niirn-
berg Judgment but were subsequently incorporated into the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948,7' and
ratified by a substantial number of States. It is thus obvious that, as
regards these offenses, the Draft Code goes beyond the Niirnberg prece-
dent. But this provision of the Code is of considerable scope and im-
portance for another reason; namely, that, although the Niirnberg
Judgment seemed to have linked the criminal responsibility of individuals
with the delinquent character of the activity engaged in by the State,72
the Draft Code, on the other hand, apparently proceeds on a differentia-
tion between State and individual responsibility. This observation can
be supported on two grounds. First, though perhaps difficult to mark
in practice, the Draft Code foresees the possibility that the authorities
of the State may become criminally responsible at a different stage than
that at which the responsibility of the State arises. In fact, there is
scarcely any doubt that, in respect to certain individuals, criminal lia-
bility may be entirely absent. These assertions are instructively illustrated
by the comment on Article 2, paragraph (12) of the Code, which states:
In including "complicity in the commission of any of the offences defined in the
preceding pargraphs" among the acts which are offences against the peace and security
69. Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 33, at 207.
70. Draft Code art. 2, para. (12).
71. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 3,
U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 3d Sess., 1st pt., Res. No. 260, at 174 (A/81) (1948) (effective
Jan. 12, 1951).
72. For discussion, see Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 266, 267 (1958).
73. Cf. Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 514-22 (1956).
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of manldnd, it is not intended to stipulate that all those contributing, in the normal
exercise of their duties, to the perpetration of offences against the peace and security
of mankind could, on that ground alone, be considered as accomplices in such crimes.
There can be no question of punishing as accomplices in such an offence all the
members of the armed forces of a State or the workers in war industries.74
It is to be further noted that the criminal responsibility of the author-
ities of the State will not arise at all if it can be shown that the individual
charged with State functions did not have a moral choice in fact open
to him. 7' It is clear, therefore, that a member of the government com-
mitting any of the crimes enumerated in the Code will be criminally
liable only if, in light of the prevailing circumstances, it was quite pos-
sible for him to act contrary to superior orders.7
And, secondly, while the criminal responsibility of the State is en-
forced by sanctions provided for by the Charter of the United Nations,"
in respect to the individual, the penalty for any of the offenses defined
in the Code is to be determined by the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction
over the accused.7 In this connection, the Code envisages international
criminal jurisdiction over individuals, but, pending its establishment,
measures may be adopted for the application of the Code by national
courts. 71 It is highly relevant to note that, according to the Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court, drafted by the United Nations
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction in 1951 and revised
in 1953, in the trial of persons accused of crimes against international
law, in which crimes against peace are clearly included, the court is to
apply international criminal law and, when appropriate, national law.
This would seem to suggest that the trial of persons is to take effect
without any reference to principles of State responsibility.," The com-
bined operation of these principles would seem to establish beyond any
vestige of doubt that a criminal individual liability may exist without
74. International Law Comm'n, Report, supra note 59, at 13.
75. Draft Code art. 4. This is identical with Article S of the Nilrnberg Charter. See In-
ternational Law Comm'n, Report, supra note 59, at 13.
76. This is brought out in Draft Code art. 4, comment, in International Law Comm'n,
Report, supra note 59, at 13.
77. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
78. Draft Code art. 5.
79. International Law Comm'n, Report, supra note 59, at 11.
So. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court art. 2, in Report of the Commit-
tee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U-'. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11
(A/2136), Annex I, at 21-25 (1952). See generally, Carjeu, Quelques Aspects du Nouveau
Projet de Statut des Nations Unies pour une Jurisdiction Criminelle Internationale, Co Revue
Ci6ral de Droit International Public 401-15 (1956).
81. Cf. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind, 4 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 445, 461 (1955).
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any degree of connection with State responsibility. 2 It will be recalled
that under the Niirnberg Judgment the responsibility of the State and
of the individual were indissolubly linked.
In summing up the discussion of the Draft Code, it may be stressed
that the type of criminal responsibility found therein is, in respect to
crimes against peace, decidedly more far-reaching than that seen in the
Niirnberg Charter and Judgment. It is in this sense that the provisions
of the Draft Code are innovatory rather than declaratory of existing
law. It may well be that the Draft Code represents an attempt to over-
come the difficulties raised with respect to the retroactivity charge of
the Niirnberg Charter. However, the broader basis upon which the
criminal responsibility of individuals is predicated may be open to the
objection that it is vague and general in the extreme, and that, in the
area of international crimes, more precise conceptions are required to
avoid the charges of retroactivity and of violation of the maxim, nulla
poena sine lege, repeatedly lodged against the Niirnberg trial.83 These
criticisms are likely to arise as long as there is no international legislature
to enact the law and no international criminal court to achieve uniformity
of decision. 4 But, even conceding such objections, it should be quite
evident that underlying the Draft Code is the attempt to tighten up
the obligations of individuals in respect to acts which vitally engage
the peace and security of mankind.
III. CRIMES AGAINST PEACE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF SOME STATES
It should be clear from the preceding observations that the Inter-
national Law Commission presented its proposal de lege ferenda and,
hence, the provisions of the Code are far from being binding upon the
States. But apart from the Draft Code, it should be mentioned that the
national constitutions of a number of States explicitly recognize the
criminality of aggressive war. As a vivid illustration of a typical con-
stitutional provision, the Constitution of Italy may particularly be noted,
for it states:
Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense to the liberty of other peoples or
as a means of settlement of international disputes, and, on conditions of equality
82. Cf. Bowett, op. cit. supra note 72, at 268.
83. This is likely to arise in view of the fact that the Draft Code does not provide for
the punishment of the offenses. Thus, Article 5 states: "The penalty for any offence defined
in this Code shall be determined by the tribunal exercising jurisdiction over the individual
accused, taking into account the gravity of the offence." Draft Code art. S. See Stone, Legal
Controls of International Conflict 370-71 (rev. ed. 1959).
84. See generally Fenwick, Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 98, 100 (1952).
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with other states, agrees to the limitations of her sovereignty necessary to an
organization which will assure peace and justice among nations, and promotes and
encourages international organizations constituted for this purpose.ea
In varying formulations, the same principle has been incorporated in
the constitutions of many other States.!G It follows from this exposition
that, even if no universally binding convention imposes upon the States
the obligation to punish the preparation and waging of a war of aggres-
sion, the domestic legislation of the States may explicitly prohibit it.87
The provisions of the constitutions here cited, concurrent with the con-
ventions previously mentioned, show that there is a firm conviction
among governments that aggressive war should be made an international
delinquency. Although some may argue that the matter was definitely
settled at Niirnberg, nevertheless, it may be observed that the Niirnberg
Judgment stands as a sober reminder that the future possibility of legally
imputing criminal responsibility to individuals for planning and waging
aggressive war still needs to be determined by a more explicit principle
of existing international law."5 This conclusion is not only inescapable,
but the world community cannot safely afford to ignore it.83
IV. Cpn s AGAINST PEACE AND POLITICAL OFFENSES
That crimes against peace may most accurately be described as
purely political offenses and, therefore, nonextraditable, can scarcely be
disputed. This position was forcefully suggested by Judge Roling in his
85. Constitution of the Italian Republic, 1947, art. 11. For text, see 2 Peaskee, Constitu-
tions of Nations 279-S0 (1950).
86. See the following constitutional provisions: Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1949, arL 26; Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, 1949, art. 5;
Constitution of Japan, 1946, art. 9; Constitution of the Philippines, 1947, art. 2, § 3; Con-
stitution of the Republic of Korea, 1948, art. 6; Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947,
§ 211; Constitution of Venezuela, Preliminary Declaration.
87. In addition, some laws punishing offenses against the peace and security of mankind
were enacted by the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Poland, Roumania, and the Outer Mlongolian Republic. These laws, however, deal with
war propaganda, which is punishable as a criminal offense. For the texts of these laws, see
46 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 34, 99-105 (1952). See generally Garcia-Mora, International Re-
sponsibility for Subversive Activities and Hostile Propaganda by Private Persons Against
Foreign States, 35 Ind. L.J. 306, 322-24 (1960); Grzybowshi & Pundefi, Soviet Bloc Peace
Defense Laws, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 537 (1952).
SS. The reference to acts of aggression in Article 1 and the limitation upon force in
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter would seem to be of little help here. U.N. Charter
arL 1, para. 1; art. 2, para. 4. For discussion of these provisons, see Goodrich & Hambro,
Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 59, 67 (1946).
89. McDougal & Feliciano, Law and Alinimum World Public Order: The Legal Regula-
tion of International Coercion 59-62 (1961).
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dissenting opinion from the Tokyo Judgment. As his words bear directly
upon the subject under consideration, it may be useful to quote them
here in full. Dealing with crimes against peace, he stated:
Crime in international law is applied to concepts with different meanings. Apart from
those indicated above, it can also indicate acts comparable to political crimes in
domestic law, where the decisive element is the danger rather than the guilt, where
the criminal is considered an enemy rather than a villain, and where the punishment
emphasizes the political measure rather than the judicial retribution.
In this sense should be understood the 'crime against peace,' referred to in the
Charter ...
As long as the dominant principle in the crime against peace is the dangerous
character of the individual who committed this crime, the punishment should only
be determined by considerations of security. 90
The above characterization of crimes against peace would seem to be
in accord with more recent authoritative opinion." It may be mentioned,
in addition, that this opinion is not without precedent to support it, for
when the Treaty of Versailles attempted to lay down the basis for the
prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II and other German leaders for "a su-
preme offense against international morality and the sanctity of trea-
ties,"" and a demand for the surrender of the Kaiser was made to the
Dutch Government in whose territory he had taken refuge, the latter
refused his extradition on the ground that the Dutch tradition had been
always to offer asylum to those conquered in international conflicts. 3
Much the same position was maintained by the neutral nations after
World War II when faced with the possible extradition of Nazi officials
found within their jurisdiction. 4 Clearly then, there is respectable author-
ity for the view that persons accused of crimes against peace are purely
political offenders and, therefore, not subject to surrender. Four reasons
of legal policy would seem to give additional support to this conclusion.
First, as the previous discussion of crimes against peace has shown,
the offenses included in this category are too vague to give definite and
concrete results, and are productive of questionable consequences in
specific cases. It may be argued, therefore, that, in the absence of a
precise definition of crimes against peace, the persons accused of such
offenses do not in fact know the unlawful character of the acts in
90. For the text of this opinion, see Sohn, Cases on United Nations Law 931-38 (1956).
91. See Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law 168-69 (1960).
92. Treaty of Versailles arts. 227. For text, see 13 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 151 (1919).
93. See Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 14 Am.
J. Int'l L. 70, 91 (1920); Wright, The Legal Liability of the Kaiser, 13 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
120 (1919).
94. See in this connection the communications of neutral governments in 12 Dep't State
Bull. 190 (1945).
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question. This argument is particularly relevant in reference to the re-
quirement of mens rea as a condition of criminal responsibility." The
absence of wens rea has been seen to underlie the nature of political
offenses. Since it is a basic element of a crime that the offender act with
criminal intent, the conclusion seems inevitable that this factor is utterly
absent where individuals do not know of the unlawfulness of the acts
that they commit? Crimes against peace, therefore, lack an essential
element of an ordinary crime and, consequently, must be regarded as
political. Even if it be assumed that aggression is a clearly defined crime
under international law, there is always a large subjective element in
the determination of an aggressor so that the most precise description
of aggression is likely to result in highly unjust decisions.?7 Certainly,
situations may arise where a leader of a country resorts to a war on the
belief that this is the only way to give his country "a place in the sun"
or, perhaps, to prevent an imminent attack from foreign territory s
While there may be doubts as to the justice of the war in the first in-
stance and to the right of self-defense in the second, the fact still remains
that the act in question excludes the mens 7ca on the leader's part, and
in criminal law this is likely to be so regardless of whether or not the
belief is well-founded.- This reasoning is indicative of the kind of con-
sideration that underlies the political nature of crimes against peace.
It also illustrates the reason why foreign governments are reluctant to
surrender persons accused of such offenses. It may be relevant to add
that the determination of an aggressor has to be made after a war has
95. For a discussion of mens rea as an element of crimes, see Perkins, Criminal Law 654
(1957).
96. In United States v. Von Leeb, 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuerenberg
Military Tribunals 462 (1949), a United States 'Military Tribunal stated: "EWe are of the
opinion that as in ordinary criminal cases, so in the crime denominated agqcresive war, the
same elements must all be present to constitute criminality .... If a defendant did not know
that the planning and preparation for invasions and wars in which he was involved were
concrete plans and preparations for aggressive wars and for wars otherwise in violation of
international laws and treaties, then he cannot be guilty of an offense. If, however, after the
policy to initiate and wage aggressive wars was formulated, a defendant came into posses-
sion of knowledge that the invasions and wars to be waged, were aggressive and unlawful,
then he will be criminally responsible if he, being on the policy level, could have influenced
such policy and failed to do so." Id. at 4SS.
97. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 233 (1951).
98. This last possibility has been said to be the eaxercise of the right of self-defense
guaranteed by international law. This point is thoroughly discussed in Bowett, op. Cit. zupra
note 72, at 1SS-S9. For a contrary position, see Garcia-Mora, op. cit. supra note CO, at 11S-
19.
99. For discussion of such situations in the area of common crimes, see Williams, The
Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 177 (1957).
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terminated, and, thus, there is the ever present danger of imputing a
mens rea retroactively to the offender. 10 This certainly would be equiva-
lent to a unilateral decision by the victor.' The injustice implicit in this
determination is reasonably clear, for it involves the punishment of acts
to which a mens rea could not be imputed at the time of their commission.
These are considerations of criminal justice that must attend the prose-
cution even of the most hardened criminal.
Secondly, the perpetrator of a political offense is fundamentally moti-
vated by reasons of public concern and patriotic sentiments, and not at
all by personal considerations.'0 2 It has been seen that these are pre-
cisely the motivations of a political offense. The crimes against peace
prosecuted at Niirnberg and other war crimes trials would seem to indi-
cate that, even if the offenders could be regarded as misguided individ-
uals, still, their motivation was inextricably linked with what they re-
garded as the welfare of their own people. Therefore, as in domestic
politics, an alleged international offender may well fight a war of aggres-
sion for the sake of his political convictions. In such a case, as long as
he remains within the provisions of the laws and customs of war, and
does not violate the laws of humanity in the conduct of hostilities, the
acts of initiating and waging such a war, by themselves, fall within the
scope of purely political offenses. Moreover, the very nature of crimes
against peace makes it almost impossible for an offender to commit them
for his own personal advantage. Crimes against peace in the manner
already seen are intimately connected with high level policy decisions
on behalf of the State and, thus, from the standpoint of motivation, their
political criminality ought not to be open to doubt. While it is quite true,
as the Niirnberg Judgment pointedly observed, that to plunge humanity
into a war is the greatest of all crimes,03 considerable controversy may
exist as to the individuals responsible for such a condition,' 0 4 and, as
long as doubts remain on this question, the principle of nonextradition
to political offenders affords some measure of protection against possible
injustice.
Thirdly, a political offense is directed against the political and social
organization of the State.105 More specifically viewed, in a purely political
offense, the rights affected are those of the State, and there is no violation
100. Stone, Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of
Aggression 141 (1958).
101. Raja Gabaglia, Guerra e Direito Internacional 113-16 (1949).
102. Re Cimpora, [1957) Int'l L. Rep. 518, 521 (Chile).
103. 22 International Trial 427.
104. See note 98 supra.
105. See In re Gatti, [1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70) (Fr.).
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of the rights of private individuals. Recalling the crimes against peace
for which the Nazi leaders were prosecuted, it immediately becomes clear
that such acts as initiating and waging a war of aggression, planning and
preparation for such a war, and the infinite variety of acts that fall
within these concepts are exclusively directed against foreign States.
Unlike war crimes and crimes against humanity, which are directed
against individuals and which are wholly unnecessary to and unconnected
with the preparation and waging of war, crimes against peace aim at
changing a given power position between the States and it really makes
no difference whether or not the reason for such a policy can be legally
justified. These are political decisions of the highest order, in which the
very existence of the State may be vitally at stake. Thus viewed, crimes
against peace are not merely incidental to an international upheaval;
they are in fact the means of bringing about such a disturbance. These
offenses are very much in the manner of treason, sedition and espionage,
where the State is the exclusive target of the offense, although public
officials and private individuals may become incidentally involved. Crimes
against peace, therefore, have a political objective and even the most
stringent extradition practice is likely to regard them as political.""
Finally, in the absence of an impartial international criminal court
endowed with jurisdiction to try individuals charged with crimes against
peace, and since history indicates that "post-war justice is unilateral,"'u 6
serious legal questions arise as to whether persons accused of crimes
against peace should be surrendered by the asylum State. It was indeed
historically in this context that the neutral nations in the last war ex-
pressed apprehension."' It is also in this context that the principle of
nonextradition of political offenders most clearly retains continued valid-
ity, for it is necessary to protect individuals not only against the exercise
of jurisdiction over such vague and general crimes by Tribunals uni-
laterally established by the victor, but also against violations of such
well-settled safeguards of criminal justice as prohibition of retroactive
legislation and of meting out a penalty for which there was no law at
the time of the commission of the offense. However, a convincing argu-
ment may be made that crimes against peace are excluded from the
category of political offenses by The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which states that the right of asylum "may not be invoked in
the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or
106. See the Swiss practice. Federal Extradition Law of Jan. 22, 1s92, art. 10, in Har%-ard
Research in International Law, Extradition, 29 Am. 3. Int'l L. Supp. 66, 423 (1935) (Svit)
(unofficial translation).
107. Corbett, op. cit. supra note 97, at 229.
10. For communications to this effect, see 12 Dep't State Bull. 190 (1945).
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from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions."' 09 It may be submitted, nevertheless, that the future surrender of
persons responsible for crimes against peace may only be accepted by
the States-especially by the neutral States-if prosecution is to be had
in the objective atmosphere of an international criminal court itself com-
posed of judges not directly identified with the interests of the prosecuting
governments. 110 From this standpoint, the expectation will be warranted
that justice can be done entirely free from any doubt."' Unfortunately,
however, this is not the only assumption which will ensure that crimes
against peace might be regarded as common offenses for which extradition
will be granted. In order to avoid the criticisms to which the Nirnberg
trial was subjected, the advance enumeration of the crimes against peace
for which individuals are criminally liable is a condition sine qua non
of an international criminal jurisdiction that seeks to administer justice
in the world community on a technically sound legal basis. Perhaps
even more important is a reasonable consensus among the members of
the world community upon the offenses to be punished." 2 This require-
ment seems entirely proper if the obligation is imposed upon the States
to extradite persons accused of crimes against peace. These are problems
that still await clarification and which, as long as they remain unsolved,
give powerful support to the view that crimes against peace are political
offenses. From a broader perspective, insofar as the issues of trial and
punishment of aggressor individuals are concerned, this question of the
political character of crimes against peace may become deeply involved
with peace enforcement measures, thereby depriving the latter of much
of their effectiveness and force. The difficulties that may arise in this
connection have largely been ignored.
It is perhaps in recognition of the foregoing considerations that the
Peace Treaties which ended World War II imposed upon the, defeated
nations the obligation to surrender persons accused of crimes against
peace found within their jurisdiction. Thus, according to the Peace Treaty
with Italy,"' Italy agreed to "take all necessary steps to ensure the ap-
prehension and surrender for trial of: (a) Persons accused of having
committed, ordered or abetted war crimes and crimes against peace or
109. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14, para. (2) (1948); 43 Am. J.
Int'l Supp. 127, 129 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
110. Miele, Principi di Diritto Internazionale 276 (2d ed. rev. 1960).
111. Stone, op. cit. supra note 83, at 370.
112. Wright, Proposals for an International Criminal Court, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 60, 65
(1952).
113. Peace Treaty with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, T.I.A.S. No. 1648 (1950) ; 42
Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 47 (1948).
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humanity." '14 Identical provisions are found in the Peace Treaties with
Roumania,"' Bulgaria,"" Finland,"-, and Hungary."'9 Athough the con-
ception of crimes against peace in the Niirnberg sense has been clearly
incorporated in these treaties in a more enduring form, the obligation
to surrender persons charged with these offenses is limited to the defeated
nations and, thus, it is not a general rule of international law. Even in
respect to the defeated nations, the rule has not always been observed."n
In principle, however, these nations are obliged to surrender fugitives
accused of crimes against peace, and, to this extent, the peace treaties
go beyond the traditional conceptions of extradition law. But the mere
fact that this obligation had to be incorporated into treaties puts beyond
surmise that, treaty apart, the State of refuge cannot be legally com-
pelled to grant the extradition of persons charged with crimes against
peace, and, therefore, their surrender in future extradition law remains
a matter of doubt.
Perhaps of more contemporary significance is the Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees adopted in Geneva on July 28, 1951, 1
by a United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries. In excluding from
its benefits persons guilty of crimes against peace, the Convention ex-
plicitly states:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person vdith rezpect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against human-
ity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in
respect of such crimes . 1.. 12
114. Id. art. 45, para. (1)(a).
115. Peace Treaty with Roumania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (1) (a), 61 Stat. 1757,
TJA.S. No. 1649, 42 U.N.T.S. 34 (1949); 42 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 252, 254 11948).
116. Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947 art. 5, para. (1)(a), 61 Stat. 1915,
T.I.A.S. No. 1650, 41 U.N.T.S. 50 (1949); 42 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 179, 1OE (1948i.
117. Peace Treaty with Finland, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (1)(a), 4S UN.T.S. 228
(1950); 42 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 203, 205 (1948).
118. Peace Treaty with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (1)(a), 61 Stat. 2055,
T.IJA.S. No. 1651; 42 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 225, 228 (194S).
119. Even in respect to the defeated nations, however, it is not certain that the sur-
render of persons charged with crimes against peace can be so easily effected, for, in 1949,
Italy refused to extradite to Yugoslavia a person accused, inter alia, of having committed
war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity. This result was achieved depite the
provision of the Peace Treaty with Italy. See In re Rukavina, [1949] Ann. Dig. 273 (No. SS)
(Italy).
120. U.N. Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateezle Persons,
Final Act and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (A/C.2/108), at 17 41951)
(effective April 22, 1954).
121. Id. art. 1, para. (f).
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This provision is certainly related to the categories of crimes against
peace found in the Niirnberg Charter and undoubtedly assumes that the
make-up of these crimes is clear and unmistakable. The Convention should
be limited, however, to recognizing the criminality of aggressive war,
for it neither punished this crime nor provides for its extradition, thus
removing much of the apparent definitiveness of the provision. For the
meaning of crimes against peace, the Niirnberg Judgment and the deter-
minations of the other war crimes trials are still the only available
authorities. It may be pertinent to add that, since the only international
instruments that have thus far imposed the obligation to surrender per-
sons guilty of crimes against peace are the peace treaties above reviewed,
the general rule still remains whereby crimes against peace are political
offenses.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding pages have unfolded the development of crimes against
peace as originally postulated in the Niirnberg Charter down to the
present time. It is believed that enough evidence has been adduced
to support the proposition that, though the notion of crimes against
peace is most vital in a future punishment of aggression, unfortunately,
the tribunals that have dealt with these crimes have left them rather
vague and uncertain, thus casting serious doubts upon whether there
are such crimes in international law. 2' International legislation on the
subject has similarly met insuperable difficulties, largely because the gener-
alities of the Niirnberg Charter and Judgment have permeated its pre-
scriptions. From the standpoint of extradition law, the most regrettable
result of this situation is the lack of legal obligation on the part of the
asylum States to surrender fugitives accused of these offenses. This con-
clusion is unavoidable in view of the fact that crimes against peace
have been classified as political offenses for which extradition is not
granted. Although, admittedly, the exclusion of crimes against peace
from the category of political offenses may be a useful development as a
means of deterring the commission of aggression, to apply this limita-
tion without first determining the exact make-up of these offenses would
be likely to result in highly unjust decisions. It is, therefore, the im-
mediate task of international legislation to implant the conception of
crimes against peace with as much clarity and precision as it can reason-
ably muster. Only then is it possible to limit substantially the political
nature of crimes against peace, thus ensuring the surrender of offenders.
122. See Woetze], op. cit. supra note 91, at 170.
